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Abstract
 
-
 
The fact that swindlers can trick computer and 
mobile systems to commit different criminal offenses have to 
lead to the current advancement in the domain of Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs).
 
While the toolkits are growing 
mechanisms for monitoring, analyzing, gathering and 
reporting activities that can endanger computer and mobile 
systems, however, they are frequently subjected to series of 
fiery debates over the years. Thus, a wide range of taxonomy 
has been proposed to clarify their strengths and weaknesses. 
Nonetheless, researchers often reticent from critical issues 
associated with the “used alerts” and “unused alerts” that the 
toolkits can generate to warn analysts. Thus, this paper 
presents the progression of the above mechanisms over the 
years; and exhaustively explains some salient issues that were 
faulted in the previous reviews. Finally, we suggest various 
ways to improve the efficacy of the toolkits and how to lessen 
cases of intrusions across the globe.
 
Keywords:
  
intrusion detection system; a detector; alerts; 
redundant alerts; workload.
 I.
 
Introduction
 he likelihood that companies and private 
individuals across the globe can lose large sum of 
financial and material resources to swindlers under 
false ploys committed with the support of mobile and 
computer services is of great concerns both in 
academia and
 
in the industrial sector in general. These 
problems were envisaged in about four decades ago; 
and accordingly, the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
was proposed (Nehinbe, 2011). Although, the present-
day Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have evolved 
through different models, however, there are increasing 
concerns that new issues are constantly emerging from 
time to time (Ghorbani et al. 2010; Mohamed, 2013). 
 
While various discussions and open arguments 
have been carried out in media and contemporary 
literature, some technical issues are erroneously 
unstressed over the years. For instance, the concept of 
IDS started from the work of Anderson in 1980 when the 
scholar classified users of mainframe computer systems 
into abnormal; and
 
normal users (Anderson, 1980). 
Some of the existing IDSs that can be used for research 
purposes include Snort, Bro; and OSSEC (Stavroulakis 
and Stamp, 2010; Rehman, 2003; Bro, 2017).
 
 
 
Figure
 
1:  Alert from Snort on public trace file
 
The central issue here is that as shown in Figure 
1, IDS extracts and logs attributes from every suspected 
packet it notices for further analysis. Unfortunately, 
these have also generated series of issues over the 
years. 
An intrusion is a breach of security of a 
computer or mobile system (Stallings, 2011). Also, it can 
represent an act of unlawful access to a digital system. 
In this case, the location of the intruders can be inside 
or outside of the networks. For this reason, intruders are 
categorized as intruders that are insiders and intruders 
that are outsiders. As both names imply, the former 
depicts malicious users that are inside the computer or 
mobile networks and the latter are malicious users that 
are outside the computer or mobile networks.  
The concept of intrusions may signify 
interruption of traffics in transit, stoppage or deliberate 
delay of services from reaching service users; invading 
sensitive information, destruction of components of the 
computer and mobile systems by causing severe 
damage to the software, hardware and some useful files 
(Kizza, 2009). Some intrusions can modify, corrupt, 
delete and erase directory. Accordingly, the 
developments of their various types often generate 
series of technical issues that were raised, analyzed, 
discussed and meticulously disputed in the past
 
years. 
 
The development has also lead to the evolution 
of standards, policies and best practices being 
proposed to lessen cases of intrusions over the years. In 
this note, qualifications, professional development and 
professional certifications are also emphasized as 
benchmarks for the recruitment of computer and mobile 
security professionals in some settings. Unfortunately, 
cases of intrusions are emerging every day. Computer 
users, mobile users; and community of security teams 
are mostly apprehensive due
 
to the unpredictable 
menace of dangerous and sophisticated dimensions for 
compromising the security of resources reportedly 
occurring in some quarters globally. 
 
Organizations and people that are victims of 
sophisticated intrusions can be devastated as a result of 
their experiences. Sophisticated intruders can swindle 
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people and firms funds that they have accumulated, 
stored and planned for the implementation or funding of 
projects within overnight. 
Sophisticated intruders can damage corporate 
image and personality that have built over the years 
within a twinkle of eyes (Gary, 2007; Mohamed, 2013). 
Sophisticated intruders can intrude into the computer or 
mobile systems with the purpose to cheaply embarrass 
a wide range of community of people. They can leak 
sensitive information about the governments, agencies, 
corporate firms and highly dignified people such as 
celebrity and scholars to competitors, opponents; and 
enemies without the rethink of the consequences of their 
malicious behaviors on the victims. 
In another dimension, there are series of 
overheads regarding spending, cost, apportioning of 
resources, control and the mechanisms necessary to 
promptly thwart sophisticated intrusions in a real-life 
environment. 
Irrespective of the motives and the category of 
the intruders, successful and unsuccessful attacks on 
computer and mobile systems always leave potential 
dangers behind. The existence of cartel of intruders is 
often reaffirmed in literature. Thus, intruders may share 
the previous experience they have garnered with 
colleagues. The danger of such information sharing can 
be enormous if they divulge the information to 
dangerous and more skillful intruders that are bent to 
launch devastating, stealthy or destructive attacks 
against the previous victims.  
A technical issue here is that, in the present day 
setting, strong IDSs will alert whenever unskilful 
computer and mobile users mistakenly infringe the 
security of other digital systems that the detectors 
monitor. Conversely, despite the evolutionary trend in 
the development of IDSs, it is improbable for the 
mechanism of intrusion detections to discriminate and 
subsequently classify attacks by the intention of each 
intruder. 
Besides, numerous scholars have categorized 
IDSs into different categories. Debar et al. (2000) 
notably categorized IDSs by source of data, method; 
and concept that an IDS uses for detecting attacks. The 
taxonomy produced by Axelsson (2000) classified them 
by the detection, operations and objectives of the IDSs. 
In the reviewed carried out by Debar et al. (2000), 
misuse and anomaly detection methods are 
fundamental approaches for developing the IDSs. 
Nonetheless, as argued by Lazarevic et al. (2005) and 
corroborated by Scarfone and Mell (2007), IDSs lack 
universally acceptable classification models.  
This paper exhaustively reclassifies existing 
IDSs on the bases of the source of data the IDS uses, 
the method of detection, function, structural design, the 
location of the detector and reporting strategies used by 
the IDS. Unlike the previous taxonomy, this paper 
explains critical and inherent issues that can maximize 
values and trust repose on the usage of IDSs as devices 
for adequately safeguarding computer and mobile 
systems from intrusions. Also, the paper has delved into 
the complexity of the intrusion detections and the 
existence of different methodologies for detecting 
malicious activities and eventually evolves better 
strategies for manufacturers on how they can upgrade 
the existing toolkits.  
The remaining sections of this paper are 
organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the evolution 
of IDSs since the 1980s. Sections 3 and 4 express some 
of the emerging issues identified with IDS alerts and the 
conclusion of the paper, respectively. The latter also 
provides the overview of the analyses and opens up 
new research directions to improve the efficacies of 
IDSs. 
II. The Advancement in Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSS) 
Debar et al. (2000), Ghorbani et al. (2010) and 
some scholars have proposed revised taxonomy for 
IDSs. However, such classifications have not explicated 
some technical issues recently identified while working 
with IDSs. Accordingly, we reclassify IDSs by the source 
of data that the IDS uses; the method the existing IDS 
use for detection of intrusions; the basic functions the 
IDS can perform; the structural design underpinning 
each IDS, the location of the detector within computer 
and mobile networks and various reporting strategies 
that the IDS used over the years. Hence, Figure 2 
illustrates the schematic drawing of the proposed 
taxonomy to simplify the relationship between one 
category of IDS and another category.  
a) Classification by source of data 
An IDS can be categorized on whether the 
detector obtains data from the database logs, operating 
system’s logs, application’s logs, transaction logs (in 
the case of financial organisations), trace files such as 
network traces, dump of an operating system, database 
and network operations and alerts from other intrusion 
detectors (Axelsson, 2000; Nehinbe, 2011). 
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Figure  2:  Categories of IDS 
b) Classification by function  
Different models of intrusion detectors have 
different capabilities. Accordingly, intrusion detectors 
can be categorized into host-based, network-based and 
hybrid intrusion detection systems (Karthikeyan and 
Indra, 2010). A host-based intrusion detector analyses 
activities of users occurring on the host computers. 
However, this model is ineffective to detect attacks that 
flood computer networks such as buffer over-flow and 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that 
specialized IDS can quickly detect at the network level 
(Scarfone and Mell, 2007).  
Contrarily, a Network-based Intrusion Detector 
(NID) otherwise known as Network Intrusion Detection 
System (NIDS) can only analyze activities of users at the 
network level. The detector validates each packet that 
migrates across its sensor with inbuilt rules or policies. 
Subsequently, the NIDS raises alerts to warn the 
presence of intrusions on the networks whenever a 
packet matches any of its detection rules (Amer and 
Hamilton, 2011). Usually, network-based intrusion 
detectors can also monitor activities on wired and 
wireless networks. Mobile network intrusion detector is a 
device that monitors wireless network nodes (Scarfone 
and Mell, 2007). However, NIDS has critical drawbacks. 
For instance, the strengths of NIDS depend on the 
capability of the rules or policies that the detector uses 
to detection network intrusions. Besides, the inability of 
some categories of the NIDS to accurately decode 
traffics that intruders deliberately encrypt is often a 
subject of contention in a realistic environment. Also, the 
efficacy of the NIDS to report fraudulent activities at the 
database, operating system and application levels is 
bad (Rehman, 2003).
 
The hybrid model integrates network-based and 
host-based intrusion detectors (HIDS) together. This 
category of detectors can concurrently monitor activities 
of the user both at the host level and at the network 
level. Nevertheless, adequate amount of capital and 
memory space are usually required to effectively 
implement HIDS in a realistic setting.
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c) Classification by method of detection 
Some intrusion detectors can detect activity that 
deviates from normal behavior, while others can only 
detect known or anticipated attacks. The former 
category is called anomaly detectors while the latter is 
known as signature detectors. In Bishop (2003), an 
anomaly detector has a set of activities or profiles to 
represent “normal behaviors” in its detection engine. 
Operators of the IDS can derive normal behaviors from 
the historical behaviors of the host, operating system, 
application and the users of the networks. The detector 
then compares inbound and outbound traffics with its 
profiles and subsequently raises alerts for traffics 
deviate from the normal behaviors. The significance of 
this design is its capability to detect new attacks. 
However, the major concern about anomaly detectors is 
the integrity of the reports they generate. Secondly, 
activities that constitute normal and abnormal behaviors 
can change over time (Chandola and Kumar, 2009).  
Misuse detectors are also called signature-
based detectors because they keep databases of 
patterns, known vulnerabilities or signatures of known 
and anticipated attacks (Bishop, 2003; Wang et al. 
2006).  
The IDS that uses misuse detection methods 
usually compares incoming and outgoing traffics with 
each of its detection rules in a top-down manner. The 
detector will subsequently trigger alerts whenever a 
packet matches any of its rules to indicate the presence 
of suspicious message intending to access the 
computer. Conversely, the mechanism will ignore a 
packet that does not match any of its rules by treating 
each of them as a normal packet (Bishop, 2003). 
However, a signature-based detector can only detect 
attacks that match its detection rules.  
Most signature-based detectors are criticised 
for the inability to decode encrypted traffics (Scarfone 
and Mell, 2007). Network intrusion detectors have 
limited capacity to process packets. For this reason, 
some of them can drop significant number of packets 
whenever attackers overload them with network traffics.  
In effect, misuse and anomalous IDSs have 
several flaws. Operators must constantly update profiles 
of anomaly detectors and the signatures of misuse 
detectors (Karthikeyan and Indra, 2010). 
d) Classification by intervals between detection and 
analysis  
In Lazarevic et al. (2005), IDSs are classified 
into real-time and off-line systems. A real-time intrusion 
detector analyzes computer activities while in progress 
and concurrently raises alerts once an attack is 
detected. Contrarily, off-line intrusion detector reports 
activities after the events have happened. 
Furthermore, giving the inadequacies of 
detection capacities of the current versions of IDSs, it is 
plausible that analyzers of intrusion logs can take wrong 
decisions against legitimate events in a real-time 
manner.  
Similarly, an off-line intrusion detection mode 
exposes computer resources to risks, especially if there 
is a relatively long time interval between the time the 
detector detects the attacks and the time to review the 
IDS logs. 
e) Classification by method of deployment  
There are centralized, distributed and hybrid 
intrusion detection models (Lazarevic et al. 2005). A 
centralized IDS usually aggregates alerts of other IDSs 
at a fixed location. The detector can easily detect 
stealthy attacks that below threshold operators have 
defined in each segment of the network whenever they 
analyze intrusion logs at a central location.  
Nevertheless, the efficacy of this design 
depends on stable communications between the 
contributing sources and the repository where the 
operators will analyze the data. Furthermore, the 
capability of centralized IDS to overcome discrepancies 
that may exist within the logs of different models of IDS 
is another weakness that is peculiar to this model. 
Distributed intrusion detectors analyze logs of 
computer activities in individual locations. In Debar et al. 
(2000), the benefit of this model is that multiple intrusion 
logs can be used to validate each other in reducing 
false positives. Nevertheless, security experts often 
encounter different challenges whenever they have to 
review several intrusion logs.  
Also, a hybrid model combines centralized and 
distributed models to achieve high intrusion detection 
rate. Nonetheless, integrated IDSs often combine the 
weaknesses inherent in all the cooperating IDSs. 
f) Classification by method of reporting 
The action that an IDS takes upon the detection 
of an intrusion has a significant impact on the group the 
detector belongs. Hence, Lazarevic et al. (2005) group 
IDSs into passive and active response models. The 
passive response detectors can not deter attacks in 
progress, unlike the active response detectors that can 
generate alerts and initiate preventive actions to block 
attacks from achieving the objectives of the attackers. 
The major problem with passive and active response 
models is that both approaches still exhibit 
shortcomings that are similar to that of the real-time and 
offline models (Lazarevic et al. 2005). 
The fundamental truth is that all the above 
models of IDS collectively generate alerts such as 
shown in Figure 3 and such information can degenerate 
to series of problems. 
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III. Emerging Issues with Formats of 
IDS Alerts 
IDSs organize, log and display alerts in different 
manner. This paper uses Bro and Snort IDS as 
examples of NIDSs (Alder et al. 2007; Bro, 2017). For 
instance, Snort logs alert in ASCII and full alert’s 
formats. Nonetheless, ASCII formats cannot be 
immediately discernible or readable by human 
operators. Operators will still need specialized tools to 
decode, read and analyze them before they can make 
meanings decisions from them. This indicates a danger 
if the analyzers that can decode the logs are not readily 
available and operators must promptly take decisons to 
discern suitable countermeasures that will thwart attacks 
signified by such logs. 
Snort can generate comprehensive information 
that will include the packet’s headers and Snort’s 
assigned attributes. The mechanism can further assign 
the rule that triggers the alerts, the description, time and 
date the event is logged. The detector can be 
configured to produce different output modes such as 
fast, full or console. This functionality enables the 
operators to configure Snort to generate less output 
whenever such requirements arise. 
Each NIDS has its peculiar signatures and 
formats for writing the detection rules. For example, Bro 
captures comprehensive information about suspicious 
traffics into tab-separated log files. Such verbose 
narrations usually include each the host, connection, 
extraction of vital information from many application-
layer protocols and server responses. The major 
strengths of NIDSs are many. Experience suggests that 
NIDSs such as Snort and Bro can analyze PCAP files in 
offline mode and IPv4 and IPv6 formats (Bro, 2017). The 
detectors can be used for forensic analysis of intrusive 
evidence in real-life networks. 
IV. Emerging Issues with Kinds of IDS 
Alerts 
Existing IDSs trigger “disused alerts” and “used 
alerts”. The former are categories of warnings that 
analysts will never use for any significant purpose. Also, 
they are warnings that are mostly abandoned by 
professionals for some reasons. However, it is usually 
hard to establish the degree of severity of such 
messages without making a thorough investigation 
about them. Hence, analysts must be prudent in 
handling them in a realistic environment. 
 
Figure
 
3:  Snort’s alerts on a publicly available dataset
 
Conversely, the latter are warnings that analysts 
use for decision purposes such as the investigation of 
the incident of intrusions, designing countermeasures 
and mitigation’s strategies. Redundant warnings, alerts 
workload and diverse processing methods for 
processing IDS alerts are central aspects of emerging 
issues associated with “used alerts” that are within IDS 
logs in a recent time. 
 
a)
 
Redundant alerts
 
Redundant alerts are fundamental problems of 
intrusion detection technology. These issues are the 
main challenges to the usage of IDSs for network 
forensics over the years because they can complicate 
the problems of classification, data reduction, false 
positive; intrusion correlation and reporting (Nehinbe, 
2011; Tjhai et al. 2008). 
 
It is possible to explain the above concept in 
three different perspectives: The first problem is how to 
reasonably reduce the entire alerts in an intrusion log 
without underestimating security breach the IDS has 
reported (Nehinbe, 2011). The second challenge is how 
to promptly discern false warnings from realistic attacks 
so that operators will not implement countermeasures 
are against legitimate events (Stallings, 2011). The third 
issue is how to eliminate less critical alerts from an 
intrusion log to enhance clarity of the reports.
 
Redundant alerts originate from the point at 
which the NIDS decides on the network packets that it 
would respectively classify as suspicious and normal 
packets or activities (Scarfone and Mell, 2007). On the 
whole, every NIDS has detection rules or signatures, 
patterns or characteristics of events that suggest 
intrusions. The detector uses the rules to validate each 
of the packets that the detector notices. 
 
Fundamentally, the detector will raise an alert 
each time a packet matches its detection rule to signify 
an intrusion or suspicious activity. The mechanism 
records the warnings inside the log in the order of 
occurrence for further review. NIDS treats outbound or 
inbound traffic as a new occurrence within the same 
timestamp. Hence, the IDS toolkit often triggers 
overwhelming alerts that may suggest notices of closely 
related packets (Nehinbe, 2010). Therefore, analysts 
automatically inherit the classification problems that the 
detector cannot adequately tackle.
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b) Alerts workload 
Human operators must re-examine the content 
of IDS logs. Usually, more time and efforts are spent to 
ascertain the correctness of the redundant warnings, 
and to substantiate suitable preventive measures. 
Furthermore, the occurrence of indiscernible 
relationships among the entries within the log can 
complicate the process of analyzing them. 
Furthermore, the problems of alerts workload 
can degenerate to swamping whereby the detector 
triggers excessive warnings that exceed the capability of 
the analyst. One of the established approaches to 
lessen the problems of alerts workload is to configure 
the detector to suppress some significant quantity of 
alerts at a specified time and by ignoring specific 
network traffic (Alder et al. 2007; Rehman, 2003; 
Scarfone and Mell, 2007). Similarly, operators can 
configure the detectors to trigger specific quantity of 
alerts. The operators can also deactivate nuisance rules. 
Also, they can reconfigure the IDS by prioritizing the 
detection rules so that rules that have low priorities will 
trigger little or no alerts. Nevertheless, any of the 
methods above will only be possible to be carried out 
with a detector that has such functionalities.  
Secondly, alerts suppression techniques are 
vulnerable to the high rate of false negatives, especially 
whenever an intruder attacks a target machine with 
probing attacks that are below the threshold for 
suppressing the alerts. For instance, a packet of ping 
attack that is below the threshold is enough to evade 
detections.  
Alerts suppression techniques have a 
propensity to bury small relationships that are sneaky 
intruders deliberately embedded in multiple alerts. For 
these reasons, alerts suppression methods frequently 
underestimate security breaches on the computer and 
mobile networks. 
Moreover, it is cumbersome to reconfigure all the 
detection rules that NIDS uses as a method for reducing 
alerts workload (Alder et al. 2007). These tradeoffs have 
necessitated the implementation of NIDS in a default 
mode while operators can decide to adopt correlation 
and aggregation techniques to manage the problems of 
alerts workload that are inherent in its operations.  
c) Different methods for processing IDS alerts 
There are numerous ways and approaches to 
process alerts logged by IDSs. For instance, Figure 4 
shows how we analyze alerts from Snort in the course of 
implementing clustering of intrusive trace files by C++ 
programs. 
 
Figure
  
4:
  
Processing alerts from Snort
 
In Nehinbe (2011), some authors have used 
Neural Networks (NN), Genetic programming, 
Visualizations; and Petri net to analyze the same 
category of publicly available datasets for testing IDS 
models in a different context (Wang et al. 2006). 
 
 
Figure  5:  Alerts from Snort
 
Similarly, analysts can adapt the same group of 
alerts from the IDS such as Snort IDS for different 
purposes. For examples, Figure 5 illustrates how 
timestamp can be used to group alerts from Snort on 
the trace files into different clusters while Figure 6 gives 
the statistical transformation we carried out with the 
same trace file. 
 
 
Figure 
 
6:  Statistical analysis of logs of Snort
 
Some authors have used other programming 
languages to process the same public trace files and to 
achieve different objectives. The central problem here is 
that it is difficult to substantiate which of the available 
methods and programming languages for analyzing 
logs of IDSs are the best ways to present such events in 
the context of digital security and forensics.
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V. Conclusion 
The possibility that victims of intrusions can 
suffer serious loss of business and trade secrets is a 
major concern across the globe. This paper critically 
reviews the evolution of the IDSs since the 1980s and 
some technical issues that arise with the existing 
models over the years. Thus, we also discuss a wide 
range of taxonomy together with their strengths and 
weaknesses.  
Furthermore, we examine potential loss that 
victims of intrusions can experience. We affirm that 
intrusions can modify and delete a listing of the files 
stored in the memory of a computer system. Intrusions 
can embarrass private users and corporate firms. 
Intruders can divulge classified information about the 
governments, agencies, corporate firms and highly 
dignified people to their competitors, opponents and 
enemies.  
Also, we show that there are overheads 
regarding control, spending, cost, apportioning of 
resources and the mechanisms necessary to quickly 
thwart intrusions in a real-life environment. However, 
series of technical issues were erroneously over-sighted 
over the years. This paper thoroughly presents a new 
review of the IDS technology to lessen them. 
Overview of the weaknesses of IDSs collectively 
suggests that they can trigger many redundant alerts. 
Such alerts can degenerate to the problems of 
swamping if the trade-offs between true positives and 
false positives are not methodologically balanced. 
Hence, a thorough review of intrusion log requires a 
high level of expertise to establish the meaning and 
validity of each alert.  
Furthermore, capabilities of attributes of alerts 
in the intrusion logs to discriminate attacks are some of 
the emerging issues we have mentioned above. The 
vast majority of the models we have reviewed above 
must be evaluated across a wide range of synthetic and 
realistic datasets. They must also be evaluated with big 
datasets to establish their performances with large and 
small evaluative datasets. 
Additionally, intrusion aggregation techniques 
lack the capability for detecting patterns of attacks 
because they are unable to isolate alerts that respond to 
failed packets from suspicious activities that can reach 
their destinations.  
Some intrusion aggregation models 
fundamentally reduce alerts redundancies and workload 
by focusing only on alerts with high priorities. Hence, 
suspicious activities that have low priorities may easily 
elude detections. 
The underpinning theories and principles of 
some research designs may not be very useful for 
solving real-world problems. Graphical approaches 
usually produce series of hyper-alerts and numerous 
correlation graphs with numerous nodes. Graphical 
approaches tend to produce edges that are difficult to 
interpret.  
Above all, the review above has not described 
how IDSs can eliminate ineffectiveness and inability to 
discriminate alerts by the information content they 
convey. We have not discussed existing mechanisms 
that are designed to ensure the predictability of each 
attribute IDSs extracted to describe suspicious packets. 
These are areas of further research direction that can be 
pursued to reduce the issues above and to improve the 
efficacies of IDSs in general. 
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